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Offer and Acceptance in Modern 
Contract Law: A Needless Concept 
Shawn J. Bayern* 
 
The fundamental law of contract formation has retained the 
formalistic character of classical contract law. The offer-and-
acceptance paradigm fits poorly with modern contracting practice, 
and it obscures and complicates contract doctrine. More importantly, 
extending it threatens to produce undesirable results. Instead of the 
offer-and-acceptance paradigm, this Essay proposes that contract 
formation be analyzed using the same general interpretive inquiry 
that governs other questions concerning the intent of contracting 
parties. 
Analyzing the processes of contract formation in this manner 
points the way toward a further-reaching reconsideration of the 
purposes of contract-formation law in the first place. In particular, 
this Essay proposes a reevaluation of the rule that parties cannot 
unilaterally rescind a contract immediately after the law deems it to 
be formed. Such a rule, too, is largely formalistic. In its place, the 
Essay offers a rule of contract formation that is more closely tied to 
the moral and instrumental purposes of contract remedies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion that contracts require an offer and an acceptance is one of the 
last remaining bastions of classical contract law. On reflection, it is striking 
how poorly the offer-and-acceptance paradigm fits large areas of contracting 
practice; it is simply untrue that all or even most contracts are formed by means 
of a salient or even recognizable offer followed by a similarly salient 
acceptance. Instead, contracts are formed in different ways as suit the different 
circumstances of contracting parties. For example, the parties might 
contemporaneously sign a common document, shake hands, use a series of 
increasingly certain verbal cues to indicate that they believe themselves to be 
bound, or allow a third party or computer technology to match them firmly with 
one another. Moreover, even in cases that may fit factually into the classical 
offer-and-acceptance paradigm, the model tends to obscure the substantive and 
interpretive questions that underlie contract formation. 
The problem is not necessarily debilitating. Perhaps surprisingly, doing 
away with the paradigm and terminology of “offer” and “acceptance” would 
not, on its own, amount to a radical change to modern contract law. 
Nonetheless, the offer-and-acceptance paradigm has a sufficiently significant 
effect on contract law that it is helpful to highlight its weaknesses. Most 
directly, exposing its problems may discourage courts and commentators from 
extending the model beyond the cases to which it is most directly applicable; 
stretching the paradigm invites at best awkwardness and at worst poor 
decisions. Similarly, brushing away the offer-and-acceptance paradigm can 
highlight useful modes of contract formation that have not received sufficient 
attention or study. 
Perhaps more importantly, moving past the offer-and-acceptance 
paradigm reveals the relatively poor functional basis for what is taken to be a 
core principle of contract law—namely, that immediately subsequent to an 
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acceptance that concludes a contract, a promise is established and expectation 
damages are available. This rule of irreversibility may be loosely justified on 
grounds of administrability, but overall it has a poor fit with both commercial 
practice and with the functional, substantive goals of contract law. The 
classical, formalistic model of contract formation should be replaced with a rule 
that depends more directly on the timing and possibility of performance 
preparations, promisee reliance, and financial speculation by one party at the 
expense of the other. Such a rule would comport better with morality, 
efficiency, and the basic underlying rationales for contract enforcement. 
This Essay first, in Part I, considers the relatively scant literature on 
contract formation. Compared with other areas of contract law, fundamental 
formation doctrine has received relatively little study , and this may be why the 
area has progressed less beyond the classical, formalistic rules. Part II 
addresses doctrinal problems with the notion of offer and acceptance, 
essentially mounting an internal legal critique of the doctrine. The chief 
argument in Part II is that in view of doctrinal coherence and simplicity as well 
as broad congruence with contracting practice, the offer-and-acceptance 
doctrine should be replaced with a more direct substantive evaluation of 
parties’ expectations. In Part III, the Essay develops a more robust theory of 
contract formation that takes into account both the instrumental role of 
damages and the noninstrumental concerns associated with enforcing promises 
that are retracted shortly after they are made. 
I. 
CONTRACT FORMATION: A NEGLECTED TOPIC 
Relatively few significant articles over the last several decades have 
evaluated the fundamental doctrine of contract formation—the offer-and-
acceptance paradigm itself. Many commentators have devoted attention to a 
variety of important, specific formation-related problems, such as questions of 
precontractual liability,1 the battle of the forms,2 form contracts and related 
problems of assent,3 and the special problems of software contracts and other 
 
 1. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining 
with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 621 (1993). 
 2. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the 
Forms: A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Victor P. Goldberg, The “Battle of 
the Forms”: Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot Rule, 76 OR. L. REV. 155 (1997); Daniel Keating, 
Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000); John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Chaos of the “Battle of the Forms”: Solutions, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1307 (1986). 
 3. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 
68 LA. L. REV. 117 (2007); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-
Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and 
Anticompetitive Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 743 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
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online contracts.4 My concern is more fundamental than these particular 
problems—it is with the foundational doctrine of offer and acceptance itself.5 
In the last twenty years or so, there have been some interesting 
contributions to foundational contract-formation doctrine from legal-economic 
scholars. In 1990, Avery Katz analyzed contract formation in terms of game 
theory.6 His analysis was largely descriptive and informative, showing the 
effects of various bargaining rules on the decisions of rational (and imperfectly 
rational) parties.7 For example, Professor Katz identified several sorts of 
transaction costs that legal rules governing bargaining might create, including 
costs of communication and, probably more notably, costs of “strategic 
behavior.”8 Thus, for example, parties might bluff, adopt hard lines in 
bargaining, and do other things that have the potential to destroy or enhance 
value. As a whole, Katz sought to provide clearer ways to consider formation 
doctrine and to understand its incentive effects. 
 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); John E. Murray, Jr., The Dubious Status of the 
Rolling Contract Formation Theory, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 35 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1307 (2005); David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [U.C.I.T.A.]: 
The Consumer’s Perspective, 63 LA. L. REV. 27 (2002). 
 5. Even Grant Gilmore’s wide-ranging book criticizing classical contract law does not offer a 
specific critique of foundational offer-and-acceptance doctrine. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE 
DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
Ian R. Macneil and Stewart Macaulay’s relational view of contracting addresses broader concerns 
but does recognize the potential “fuzziness” of formal acceptance that I discuss in Parts II and III. For 
example, Macneil has written: 
The context of “I accept employment on your terms” is a recognition of the inevitable 
tentativeness of consent to a relation, the inevitable mutuality of future superseding events, 
and all the rest of the elements which, in a relation, cause even the clearest expression of 
adhesive consent to suffer from essential fuzziness. 
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 771 (1974); see also Stewart 
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 
(suggesting that businesspeople often do not “plan exchange relationships completely”). Though my 
approach to contract law is sympathetic with many features of the relational theorists’ arguments, the 
principles I develop do not generally turn directly on the status of a prior relationship. My inquiry is, in 
some sense, broader and more fundamental, and it aims to analyze contract doctrine directly and 
generally. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 
805, 821 (2000) (praising relational contract theory in several respects but noting that it has not 
developed a “law of relational contracts” because there is “no significant difference between contracts 
as a class and relational contracts” and, accordingly, “relational contracts must be governed by the 
general principles of contract law, whatever those should be.”). 
 6. See Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the 
Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1990). 
 7. Katz agrees with me about the relative paucity of analytical study of offer-and-acceptance 
rules, at least as of 1990 and with regard to economic commentary: 
[T]he mechanical rules of contract formation so beloved to hornbook authors and bar 
examiners, and the related body of legal doctrine that helps imply the content of the contract 
from the history of the bargaining, largely have escaped attention from those legal scholars 
influenced by economics. The preponderance of the literature treats such rules as largely 
conventional, and accordingly irrelevant for purposes of policy analysis. 
Id. at 218 (footnote omitted). 
 8. See id. at 226. 
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In an interesting and helpful article a few years later, Richard Craswell 
analyzed contract formation and related it to the notion of efficient reliance in 
light of possible breach.9 To understand Craswell’s article, it is important to 
understand the (hotly contested) economic notion that contract law should 
recognize that promisees cannot always expect performance and thus should 
not always rely on promises.10 Consider the following example: 
Yvonne owns a restaurant for economists called the Waffle Shop. 
Business is going well, and Yvonne contracts with Xavier to build a 
new facility to be ready for occupancy by September 1. Many things 
could prevent Xavier from completing on time—bad weather, a 
plumbers’ strike, overscrupulous or unscrupulous city inspectors, and 
so on. To serve the new customers who will patronize the new facility, 
Yvonne must order more food, and she must order it before September 
1. Greater expenditures on food will increase her profits from the 
restaurant, since she will then be able to serve more customers in the 
period following September 1. 
Under the standard calculation of expectation damages, a promisee 
will increase expenditures in reliance on a contract up to the point 
where the expected gain from an incremental increase in such 
expenditures equals the cost of the incremental increase. Now, even if 
the promisor fully internalizes all the costs of breach that are borne by 
the promisee, there is some chance that the promisor (Xavier, in the 
hypothetical) will breach—for example, if the costs of performing 
unexpectedly turn out to be prohibitive. In choosing the socially 
optimal amount of reliance on the contract, the promisee (Yvonne, in 
the hypothetical) should take this chance of non-performance into 
account. However, the standard expectation measure does not give the 
promisee an incentive to choose the socially optimal level of reliance. 
In particular, when calculating the expected gain from an increase in 
reliance expenditures, the promisee will not discount that expected 
gain by the probability that the promisor will breach. From the 
promisee’s point of view, it is as if the promisor had insured the 
promisee that the contract would be performed. The promisee thus acts 
as if performance is certain, and chooses a level of reliance on the 
promise consistent with that assumption. The level of reliance so 
chosen will be higher than the level that would be chosen if the 
 
 9. See Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 
(1996). 
10. See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466 
(1980) (modeling the relationship between remedial regimes and overreliance); Steven Shavell, The 
Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 124 (1984); but see Shawn J. 
Bayern & Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Expectation Measure and Its Discontents, 2013 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1, 6–13 (2013); Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the 
Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1373–74 (2003) (critiquing the notion that 
overreliance should affect contract law and concluding instead that “[w]hen institutional considerations 
are taken into account . . . the theory has virtually no consequences.”). 
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promisee assumed that the promisor had a positive probability of 
breach. Choosing the higher level is inefficient. Accordingly, the 
expectation measure is flawed.11 
In view of this potential drawback of expectation damages, Professor 
Craswell’s article on the offer-and-acceptance paradigm argued that it is at least 
possible that rules of contract formation can promote efficient reliance. In 
particular, he concluded descriptively that courts tend to find that enforceable 
contracts have been formed (via rules of offer and acceptance) when they judge 
that the promisee’s reliance would have been efficient.12 Normatively, 
however, he concluded that it would be difficult to fashion specific rules of 
contract formation to encourage efficient reliance on promises, largely because 
efficient reliance needs to be determined case by case.13 
For my purposes, the most helpful modern article on contract formation is 
by leading contract-law scholar Melvin Eisenberg. In 1994, Professor 
Eisenberg introduced the notion of expression rules as a way to analyze, 
doctrinally and normatively, contract law’s rules of contract formation.14 The 
fundamental insight of Professor Eisenberg’s article is that many specific rules 
of offer and acceptance are really just crude substitutes for the general rules of 
contract interpretation—that is, bright-line rules about how to interpret certain 
types of expressions that parties make to one another. 
For example, contract law has a rule that ordinary advertisements do not 
constitute offers.15 If there were no such rule, then in evaluating whether a 
particular advertisement is an offer for the purposes of contract law, we would 
simply ask whether a reasonable person reading it would interpret it as an offer. 
Essentially, we would apply ordinary interpretive rules to determine the legal 
effects of an advertisement, just as we do to analyze most other potential offers. 
Indeed, Eisenberg provides a persuasive account that most people would, under 
most circumstances and contrary to the technical rule of contract law, believe 
that advertisements are offers.16 It is not clear, as a result, why the historical 
rule about advertisements is desirable.17 At the very least, if the rule is 
justifiable, it is probably justifiable despite contracting parties’ expectations, 
not because of them. 
As another example, Eisenberg considers the rule that an offer made 
during a conversation (in person or over a telephone call) lapses at the end of 
 
11. Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of 
Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1337–38 (2003) (paraphrasing and analyzing ROBERT COOTER 
& THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 248–57 (3d ed. 2000)). 
12. Craswell, supra note 9, at 508–31. 
13. Id. at 544–53. 
14. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Expression Rules in Contract Law and Problems of Offer and 
Acceptance, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1127 (1994). 
15. Id. at 1166–72. 
16. See id. 
17. Id. at 1171–72. 
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the conversation.18 Parties might or might not expect the operation of this rule, 
but the rule is again easier to justify—in terms of the morality and efficiency 
associated with promises—if they do. If not, the rule potentially undermines 
both the opportunity for efficient deals and the morality of promises.19 That is, 
if parties expect a deal that is cut off by the bright-line rule that offers lapse at 
the end of conversations, then the law refuses to recognize a deal that they 
wanted and under which at least one of them has promissory obligations. 
Eisenberg’s general thesis is that, with few exceptions, most of the 
expression rules in contract-formation doctrine are unjustified and that the law 
should move (and is moving) away from such rules and toward general 
principles of interpretation: “For the most part, therefore, expression rules that 
are justified at all should be cast as either weak presumptions or as maxims. If 
we look past the black-letter rules to the case law, that is just the direction in 
which contract law is moving.”20 As we will see in Part III, a central thesis of 
this Essay is essentially to expand Eisenberg’s argument in the following way: 
general interpretive principles should replace not just individual expression 
rules (operating within the offer-and-acceptance paradigm) but the whole 
notion of offer and acceptance. Just as individual rules governing whether 
advertisements are offers may be judged by how well they vindicate the 
expectations of commercial parties, applying the same analysis to the offer-
and-acceptance doctrine shows that it does no better, in practice or in theory, 
than a general interpretive inquiry—that is, the ordinary legal construction of 
the parties’ intent. 
II. 
THE DOCTRINAL DISTRACTION OF “OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE” 
This Part contends that the threshold question of contract formation that is 
addressed by the doctrine of offer and acceptance should be replaced by a 
simpler, more straightforward inquiry: Does one of the parties to a potential 
contract reasonably believe there is a contract? This is the preliminary result 
achieved when the offer-and-acceptance doctrine works properly, and indeed it 
is the ordinary result. For example, if Buyer makes an offer to Seller to 
purchase a parcel of real property for $250,000 and Seller responds in a 
potentially ambiguous manner, contract law will ordinarily evaluate Seller’s 
use of language from the perspective of a reasonable person in Buyer’s 
position; it will ask, in other words, whether Buyer reasonably believes that 
Seller accepted Buyer’s offer.21 That is fundamentally the same general 
question I am proposing. 
 
18. See id. at 1153–56. 
19. See id. 
20. Id. at 1180. 
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1981) (“Where notification is 
essential to acceptance by promise, the offeror is not bound by an acceptance in equivocal terms unless 
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Distinguishing between subjective and reasonable objective belief may be 
useful here, although the interplay between subjectivity and objectivity in 
contract law is complicated. Where both parties subjectively believe there is a 
contract, that shared belief is ordinarily sufficient, at least under modern 
American contract law, for there to be a contract.22 Where neither party 
believes there is a contract, the prominence of subjective intent is similar: there 
is no contract.23 The difference between the “subjective” interpretations that the 
parties actually hold and the “objectively reasonable” interpretations that those 
in the parties’ positions might hold arises only when the parties’ subjective 
understandings are different. In that case, the more reasonable meaning prevails 
(except where one of the parties knew or should have known of the 
misunderstanding).24 
To clarify this Part’s thesis in view of the distinctive roles of subjectivity 
and objectivity in modern American contract law, then, it is that the following 
principles should replace the offer-and-acceptance doctrine: (1) if both parties 
believe there is a contract, there should be a contract; (2) if one of the parties 
believes there is a contract, and that belief is more reasonable than the other 
party’s belief that there is no contract, there should be a contract. (This is just 
an elaboration of the simpler principle I stated at the outset.)25 
 
he reasonably understands it as an acceptance.”); cf. id. § 24 (“An offer is the manifestation of 
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent 
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.”). 
22. See id. § 201(1) (“Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or 
agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”); Eisenberg, supra note 
14, at 1134 (“Restatement Second stands the classical school’s position on its head by giving primacy 
to mutually held subjective interpretation, and resorting to an objective or reasonable meaning only in 
the absence of a mut[u]ally held subjective meaning.”). 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(1) (1981); 6 PETER LINZER, CORBIN 
ON CONTRACTS § 25.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2010) (“No contract should ever be interpreted and 
enforced with a meaning that neither party gave it.”). 
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201(2) (1981) (“[T]he meaning attached 
by [the first party prevails when] (a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the 
other, and the other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or (b) that party had no reason to 
know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the other had reason to know the meaning 
attached by the first party.”). Note that the Restatement technically appears to draw a dichotomy 
between reasonable and unreasonable interpretive beliefs, rather than to conceive reasonableness on a 
spectrum and to favor the better of two potentially reasonable interpretations. Cf. Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, 
Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1422–24 (2009) (generalizing 
from the Restatement in a similar way to find an interpretive principle based on the parties’ fault). 
25. Another elaboration may be worthwhile. To say that the test should be whether at least one 
of the parties thinks there is a contract (or both subjectively do) is potentially vague; it may help to add 
that the reasonable belief (or shared subjective belief) is about particular enforceable contract terms. In 
my view, the appropriate question for courts to ask is almost never “Is there a contract?” but rather 
“What enforceable terms, if any, are there between the parties?” 
Accordingly, the beliefs of the contracting parties that I have in mind in the text are those 
concerning the existence of (usually specifiable) enforceable terms, not merely the existence vel non of 
a contract in the abstract. As it turns out, almost nothing in contract law depends on the precise 
establishment or timing of the formation of “a contract” rather than of particular duties under it; though 
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Instead of applying these general principles of interpretation, the current 
fundamental law of “offer and acceptance” (and again, by fundamental I refer 
to the core presence of the doctrine, not to the many ancillary rules about when 
and whether an offer can be revoked, precisely when various communications 
are legally effective, precontractual liability, and so forth) serves as a workable 
but potentially awkward placeholder. The existing fundamental rules present 
two closely related dangers discussed below: (A) needless complication and 
(B) potentially poor results as the basic offer-and-acceptance paradigm is 
stretched. 
A. Needless Complication 
The simple mismatch between courts’ descriptions of the doctrine and 
frequent contracting practice demonstrates the needless complication of the 
current doctrine. Courts often declare that contracts require offer and 
acceptance,26 but contracting practice itself suggests otherwise, or at least 
suggests that the definitions of offer and acceptance are often very thinly 
stretched. 
For example, a common way to conclude a contract is for two parties to 
sign a document together. If the signatures are literally simultaneous (or their 
processes overlap temporally), there is no sequence of final communications; 
there is simply a joint act creating a contract. The same applies to shaking 
hands, which is perhaps an even more conventional way of indicating an 
agreement. In these cases, there is no discrete, identifiable sequence of offer 
and acceptance. 
Even in the case where one party signs a contract just before another (so 
that there is technically a sequence of events leading up to contract formation), 
to call the first signature an offer and the second an acceptance may be 
distracting and even untenable. If nothing else, such terminology stretches the 
ordinary definitions of the terms and seems to serve little function. Perhaps in 
 
that matter is beyond the scope of this Essay, it is worth pointing out that even largely formal 
endeavors, like computations of the intervals associated with statutes of limitations, depend on the 
timing of breach (of particular duties) rather than of formation. 
26. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Johnson, 629 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(“The formation of a valid, express contract under New York law requires an offer, acceptance, 
consideration, mutual assent, and intent to be bound.”); Dantz v. Apple Ohio LLC, 277 F. Supp. 2d 
794, 801 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (“What is required to validate the arbitration agreement and make it 
contractual is an offer and acceptance, supported by consideration.”); In re Estate of Kampen, 135 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 410, 425 (Ct. App. 2011) (“It is elementary that a contract requires an offer and 
acceptance . . . .”); R.C. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Office Sys., 622 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Miss. 1993) (“It is 
basic contract law that a contract requires an offer and acceptance.”); May v. Anderson, 119 P.3d 
1254, 1257 (Nev. 2005) (“Basic contract principles require, for an enforceable contract, an offer and 
acceptance, meeting of the minds, and consideration”); Cargill, Inc. v. Kavanaugh, 228 N.W.2d 133, 
138 (N.D. 1975) (“Basically, Hornbook law (i.e., Simpson on Contracts) tells us that a contract 
requires an offer, and acceptance of that offer, and mutual acceptance and understanding of the offeror 
and offeree as to the terms of the legally enforceable obligation thus incurred.”). 
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some cases the act of signing a document is meant to convey an offer (“I have 
committed; now it is your turn to do so”), but this is not necessarily true. In the 
typical case of jointly signed agreements, the parties have worked out the 
details through an ongoing process in which they gradually reached an 
understanding, in no particular sequence, and understand that they will finalize 
the deal by signing a document jointly. That is, the second-to-last step in 
forming a contract might not have any role in inviting the final one. And, to say 
that the offer-and-acceptance paradigm is serviceable because courts and 
commentators can always identify some second-to-last act (called an offer) and 
some final act (called an acceptance) that bring a contract into existence27 
seems to miss the point that many such acts are not offers or acceptances except 
in a very stylized sense. More subtly (and admittedly fancifully), when 
contracts are concluded at a distance, it may be not only practically impossible 
to say which act was the second-to-last and which was the last, but also 
theoretically indeterminate under the theory of special relativity.28 
More practically speaking, contract doctrine at best spins its wheels 
needlessly in trying to classify various actions as offers or acceptances when it 
should be asking a more direct interpretive question concerning the parties’ 
intent. This problem manifests itself in two ways: (1) the doctrine obscures the 
underlying substantive questions of modern contract law, and (2) it adopts 
needless categories that, as I have already suggested, fit poorly with practical 
contracting practice. 
 
27. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Stephen R. Brill, Is an Advertisement an Offer? Why It Is, and 
Why It Matters, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 64 (2006) (referring in passing to a classical theory of contract 
law that equates an offer with “the penultimate step in the creation of a legal relationship”). 
28. The theory of special relativity teaches us, counterintuitively, that simultaneity in the 
absence of causation is relative; that is, determining the sequence of events depends on an arbitrary 
selection among many possible reference points. If two events (A and B) occur in different places and 
are not causally related, it is consistent with the universe to say, from various perspectives, that A 
occurred first, that B occurred first, or that A and B were simultaneous. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, 
RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY (1920); D. F. Comstock, The Principle of 
Relativity, 31 SCI. 767, 769 (1910) (“Neither the standpoint of the ‘moving’ observer nor our 
standpoint is wrong. The two merely represent two different sides of reality.”). So when an offer does 
not in fact invite the particular acceptance at issue (and thus serve as what business people typically 
mean by “offer”), it may be theoretically impossible to say in an absolute or objective sense which of 
the parties’ acts, concluded at some distance from one another, occurred first. I don’t suppose this 
theoretical limitation is particularly important from a practical perspective when contracts are 
concluded on Earth or its vicinity (any more than, for example, I think that Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem poses practical challenges for interpreting contracts, though some may think that). See 
generally Mike Townsend, Implications of Foundational Crises in Mathematics: A Case Study in 
Interdisciplinary Legal Research, 71 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1996) (discussing generally the overreaching 
of mathematical theory, including Gödel’s theorem, in areas beyond its domain). But it is at least 
interesting that a conceptualist model of contract law that wishes to declare every contract formed 
through a sequence of events, of which one is an offer and one is an acceptance, can theoretically run 
into a physical boundary that makes it impossible to say which is which. In other words, while 
physical theory probably does not matter directly in setting general rules for how contracts are formed, 
it may still be worthwhile to recognize that the conceptual simplicity sought by classical contract law 
may not even be consistent, in all cases, with the real universe. 
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1. Needless Obscurity 
As an example of the first problem, consider International Filter Co. v. 
Conroe Gin, Ice & Light Co.29 International Filter, which made water filters, 
sent its representative (the appropriately named Mr. Waterman) to negotiate 
with buyers. Mr. Waterman sent a document to a potential buyer that read as 
follows: 
Gentlemen: We propose to furnish, f.o.b. Chicago, one No. two Junior 
(steel tank) International water softener and filter to purify water of the 
character shown by sample to be submitted. * * *  
Price: Twelve hundred thirty ($1,230.00) dollars. * * *  
This proposal is made in duplicate and becomes a contract when 
accepted by the purchaser and approved by an executive officer of the 
International Filter Company, at its office in Chicago. Any 
modification can only be made by duly approved supplementary 
agreement signed by both parties. 
This proposal is submitted for prompt acceptance, and unless so 
accepted is subject to change without notice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
International Filter Co., 
W.W. Waterman.30 
This document elicited a response, in the form of a letter, by the buyer: 
Accepted Feb. 10, 1920. Conroe Gin, Ice, and Light Co., 
By Henry Thompson, Mgr.31 
Subsequently, at the Chicago office of International Filter, an officer 
described as “its President and Vice-President” wrote on the letter “O.K.” with 
the date and his name, and thereafter International Filter wrote a letter to the 
buyer confirming the order.32 The buyer later sought to cancel the order against 
International Filter’s wishes, and thus a contract dispute arose.33 In particular, 
the buyer alleged that no contract had been formed, in part because the internal 
notation of an acceptance by an officer of International Filter was not legally an 
acceptance.34 
The court held that under traditional contract-law principles, the original 
document signed by Waterman was not an offer because the buyer could not 
accept it; it was just what is sometimes called an “invitation to deal.”35 The 
response by the buyer indicating that the buyer had “[a]ccepted” the terms of a 
 
29. 277 S.W. 631 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925). 
30. Id. at 631. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 631–32. 
33. Id. at 632. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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deal was correspondingly just itself an offer, and the acceptance and thus 
formation of a contract occurred when International Filter’s officer wrote 
“O.K.” on the document.36 
The court’s determination that there was a binding contract seems correct, 
at least on the facts it reported; that is, International Filter appears reasonable in 
believing that a contract had been formed.37 But the court’s treatment of the 
various documents seems, at best, roundabout. The original document issued by 
Waterman had all the substance of an offer except that it required a final step 
for approval, signaling that Waterman was not himself authorized to conclude a 
contract. The buyer clearly perceived the self-styled acceptance as an 
acceptance, not an offer. It may have been an acceptance of a conditional offer 
(conditioned on further approval), but it was still substantively an expression of 
a definite intent to be bound to terms that had already been proposed. 
Instead of treating the writing of “O.K.” by International Filter’s officer as 
the act that formed a contract, the requirement for later approval should be 
analyzed simply as a condition for performance. This form of analysis has 
several advantages over the court’s. First, it’s simpler: it doesn’t require 
introducing a new kind of acceptance (which at least one leading American 
contract-law casebook calls “subjective acceptance”).38 Second, it accords 
more readily with the bilateral nature of the contract in International Filter. 
The response by Conroe Gin is arguably not a promise, and if the original 
document from Waterman is interpreted as an invitation to deal, it arguably 
contains no enforceable promise either. Yet it is clear that both parties have 
ongoing obligations once a contract is formed. 
Third, the more general “condition” analysis seems to accommodate a 
wider range of cases. For instance, I assume there would be a contract (with a 
condition) if International Filter’s original document demanded later 
“approval” by a state regulatory agency or another interested third party instead 
of from International Filter itself. In that case, the original document and the 
response would be sufficient to give rise to a contract. Under the subjective 
acceptance analysis, this sufficiency can evaporate based only on the identity of 
the party whose later approval is required. There’s nothing inherently wrong 
with that result if it doesn’t change the parties’ rights and duties, but it is 
doctrinally cumbersome; the forms of the proposal and acceptance haven’t 
changed, but their nature and effects differ depending on whose later approval 
is required. 
Perhaps more significantly, what if International Filter’s original 
document (which otherwise had the characteristics of an offer) had contained 
the following provision: “Neither party will have any obligations unless 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 632–33. 
38. LON L. FULLER ET AL., BASIC CONTRACT LAW 530–34 (9th ed. 2013). 
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executives from both our organizations—separately and subjectively—approve 
this transaction”? Suppose the buyer then “accepted” this proposal, and the 
parties each then forwarded the agreement to their executives, who both 
approved it. If contractual liability results, as it should because the parties both 
intend to be bound,39 the “condition” analysis would lead us to say simply that 
International Filter’s proposal is an offer and the buyer’s agreement an 
acceptance—that is, an offer and an acceptance of a contract with two distinct 
conditions. By contrast, under the “subjective acceptance” analysis that the 
International Filter court used, it seems as if the subjective executive approval 
that happens to occur first is something like a “subjective offer” and the second 
a “subjective acceptance.” There is little problem in saying this if it is the only 
way to reach the right result under existing doctrine, but it is cumbersome and 
entirely unnecessary. 
I strongly suspect that the only reason that the International Filter court 
introduced the notion of “subjective acceptance” was classical contract law’s 
refusal to see consideration in an “illusory” promise. Under classical contract 
principles, if International Filter can later choose not to be bound, there must 
(by deduction) be no contract.40 But under modern contract law’s significantly 
less formal views of consideration, it is easy to see the mutual consideration in 
the various hypothetical contracts I have outlined. Once we brush away the 
illusory-promise doctrine, a more general principle for contract formation 
emerges that is both simpler and more expressive than the offer-and-acceptance 
doctrine: specifically, there is no essential difference between (on one hand) a 
contract with performance conditioned on an event and (on the other hand) a 
commercial promise conditioned on the offeree’s acceptance. Acceptance is 
just one kind of event on which a promise’s performance can be conditioned. 
If, as leading functionalist scholars have proposed, questions of consideration 
in contract law exist largely to differentiate commercial from noncommercial 
promises,41 there is likely no consideration-based reason to distinguish an 
 
39. Alternatively, if there is no contract, it is hard to see why. That is, why should an extra step 
(such as prior explicit approval by one executive) be necessary for two agents to conditionally bind 
one another’s principals based on those principals’ subsequent internal acts if the agents so agree and 
the principals so approve? 
40. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 103B (rev. ed. 
1936) (stating the classical illusory-promise rule). 
41. See, e.g., 2 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.17 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 
rev. ed. 1995) (“Consideration is designed primarily to protect promisors from their own donative 
promises.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 
821 (1997). To put this perhaps more precisely, the wisdom of “consideration” may lie only in its 
separation of affective from commercial contexts; beyond that, there is little need to draw rigid 
distinctions that rule out commercial expectations from governing. Accordingly, an offer to do an act 
conditional on acceptance is really just a unilateral promise to do something that commercial norms 
dictate ought to be done on acceptance, given trade customs and the facts of particular circumstances. 
Perhaps the acceptance makes the promise enforceable only because the promise was conditioned on 
whatever acts constituted acceptance, not because the acceptance adds anything relevant (as 
“consideration”) to distinguish the case as a commercial rather than an affective one. 
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acceptance from any other kind of event on which a promise’s performance 
may be conditioned. “I promise to paint your house if you’ll agree to pay me 
$400” should receive the same treatment as Mr. Waterman’s original 
document; there is no substantively relevant difference between the two cases. 
Indeed, sensitive courts have analyzed contract formation in a way 
broadly consistent with what I am suggesting. In Jaybe Construction Co. v. 
Beco, Inc.,42 for example, the court recognized that a deal that had otherwise 
been offered and accepted might be conditioned on a further step, such as 
reducing an agreement to writing (presumably, at some later time that could be 
identical for both parties).43 Similarly, Atlantic Terra Cotta Co. v. Chesapeake 
Terra Cotta Co. recognized the possibility that “acceptance [] of an offer” 
could be “conditional on the execution of a formal contract” by the parties.44 
There is little functional reason to avoid such possibilities. 
2. Needless Categorization 
The prior Section shows ways in which the offer-and-acceptance 
paradigm complicates individual cases by obscuring the reasoning process that 
is needed to reach functional results. This Section generalizes somewhat in 
order to show ways in which the offer-and-acceptance paradigm also 
complicates the structure and categorization of contract-law doctrine. 
a. A Failure to Generalize: Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Other Similar Cases 
For one thing, the offer-and-acceptance paradigm has led to an 
unnecessary fragmentation of doctrines concerning formation. As discussed 
earlier, many real world contracts are created without any explicit “acceptance” 
or “offer-and-acceptance” pattern. For example, if I pass by a newsstand at 
which I am a regular customer and familiar with the proprietor, and in a rush I 
take a newspaper and nod toward the proprietor, pointing at my watch, the 
proprietor and I likely have a contract for the sale of goods on the usual terms 
by which we buy and sell daily newspapers.45 Modern contract law recognizes 
an obligation here, but it does so by treating the interaction as a contract 
“implied in fact.” Implied-in-fact contracts have the same legal effects as 
express contracts, but they arise differently and do not require an offer or an 
acceptance, except perhaps a fictional one. It is unnecessary to create a separate 
doctrinal category for these cases instead of recognizing that there is a contract 
(like any other contract) simply because the parties would reasonably believe 
 
42. 216 A.2d 208 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965). 
43. See id. at 211–12. 
44. 113 A. 156, 158 (Conn. 1921). 
45. This example is a generalization of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a, 
illus. 2 (1981) (“A, on passing a market, where he has an account, sees a box of apples marked ‘25 cts. 
each.’ A picks up an apple, holds it up so that a clerk of the establishment sees the act. The clerk nods, 
and A passes on. A has promised to pay twenty-five cents for the apple.”). 
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under the circumstances that they are obliged to each other on familiar terms. 
To put it differently, while International Filter highlights an area where the 
offer-and-acceptance doctrine causes the analysis of a class of cases to be more 
complicated, the separation of “implied in fact” from ordinary contracts shows 
a more general problem of doctrinal complication through unnecessary 
classification. 
The law of implied-in-fact contracts is not the only doctrine that the offer-
and-acceptance model complicates. As I suggested earlier, any case where there 
is a simultaneous, in-person expression of an agreement—a joint signed 
statement, an agreement to form many kinds of companies (such as a 
partnership or an LLC), and so on—might exhibit no offer-and-acceptance 
pattern. The law seems to respond to these factual patterns by simply ignoring 
their differences from the standard offer-and-acceptance model. Because 
questions of offer and acceptance rarely arise in these cases, courts have likely 
had little reason to consider the question carefully. But courts do of course 
acknowledge that assent can be concurrent rather than sequential, and can 
involve two parties or more than two parties (in which case the offer-and-
acceptance model becomes cumbersome very quickly).46 The case of business-
organization agreements is interesting for a related reason: they often, by their 
presence, give rise to a broader change in legal status among the parties. It is 
fine to say that such changes have nothing to do with the essence of “contract 
law,” but that sort of essentialism creates legal categories that are justified only 
by circular reasoning. In other words, it seems better to say simply that by 
agreeing to co-own a business, parties agree to other rights and duties as a 
result of their circumstances. This agreement is not fictional, but it may not 
come from anything related to classical “offer” or classical “acceptance.” It 
comes from the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
b. The Search for False Certainty 
The offer-and-acceptance paradigm also neglects alternative modes of 
contract formation, often in the name of legal certainty. It is not even clear, 
however, that the typical case of contract formation in fact involves an offer 
followed by an acceptance. Communications called “offers” are not rare, but 
often what they offer is a price, or some other term—not a contract. The 
contract comes into being only through a series of increasingly certain cues, or 
from the development of business circumstances, such as in cases where courts 
hold that a contract exists because of “acceptance by conduct.”47 
 
46. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. 39, 63 (1871) (Davis, J., dissenting) 
(discussing a multiparty interstate compact and referring to “a reciprocal and concurrent consent of the 
three parties to the contract”). 
47. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Rollins Envtl. Serv. (NJ), Inc., 624 N.E.2d 959 (Mass. 1993). 
And, of course, promissory estoppel in general follows no offer-and-acceptance pattern. 
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On reflection, several salient alternatives to the classical offer-and-
acceptance paradigm emerge. In one type of case, we are confident an 
agreement arises from a muddle of events, but we cannot say how—nor is it 
necessarily important to do so.48 For an extreme example of this, consider 
comedian Alun Cochrane’s assertion that his marriage proposal was never 
explicit and simply matured naturally during ordinary conversation: “I never 
had a proposal. Our marriage is honestly a conversation that got out of 
hand. . . . We were just having a chat; my wife was washing up, and then we 
were booking a wedding.”49 As a matter of casual empiricism, this pattern is 
not unusual or problematic (except, of course, for marriage proposals!). Parties 
often do not have the rules of contract law specifically in mind in their 
interactions; those interactions proceed informally, reaching at some point a 
threshold past which it is clear to the parties (if they are reasonable) that they 
are bound. Parties will never have absolute certainty that they have reached an 
agreement; what they need is reasonable confidence. The distinction between 
absolute certainty and reasonable confidence (and between legal certainty and 
practical certainty) is not appreciated enough; legal rhetoric often emphasizes 
the former, forgetting that it is unattainable and that moving toward it is not 
desirable in all contexts.50 
The opinion in Adams v. Lindsell,51 famous for originating the “mailbox 
rule” in contract law,52 presciently anticipated a problem in seeking certainty in 
contract formation. That problem was later formalized in the informational 
theory underlying modern computer networking. The court in Adams adopted 
the mailbox rule essentially to accelerate contract formation, admitting that 
such a rule might lead to some uncertainty for parties but recognizing that 
absolute certainty in reaching an agreement is impossible to achieve using an 
unreliable communicative technology: 
[T]he Court said, that if [we required each party to be confident that 
the other party had received its communication before finding an 
enforceable contract], no contract could ever be completed by the post. 
For if the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by 
the plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not 
to be bound till after they had received the notification that the 
 
48. This is roughly a contractual analogue to the notion of res ipsa loquitur in tort law: we may 
know there is a contract but be unable to say precisely how it arose, just as in res ipsa cases, we may 
know there was negligence but may be unable to specify precisely what it was. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965) (summarizing the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur).  
49. Frank Skinner’s Opinionated (BBC television broadcast Nov. 17, 2011).  
50. See Shawn J. Bayern, Against Certainty, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 (2012). 
51. (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.). 
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a) (1981) (“[A]n 
acceptance . . . completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree’s 
possession. . . .”); id. at § 63 cmt. a (calling this the “mailbox rule”). 
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defendants had received their answer and assented to it. And so it 
might go on ad infinitum.53 
A century and a half later, this intuition was proven as a matter of 
epistemic logic (the logic of knowledge and belief) and computer networking 
theory.54 Mathematicians and network theorists know this pattern of 
communicative fragility as the “Two Generals Problem.”55 In the scenario 
usually discussed,56 two allied generals are located at a distance from each 
other and can communicate about their readiness for an attack only over an 
unreliable medium, like carrier pigeons that might be shot down or otherwise 
fail to reach their destination. Their military strategy requires them to attack a 
common enemy either together or not at all. The question is whether, under 
these conditions, they can ever mount an attack. If absolute certainty in 
agreement is required, the answer—as the Adams court saw—is that they 
cannot. The first general cannot attack until she sends the second general a 
message and confirms that it has been received; the second general cannot 
attack until he receives the message, writes an acknowledgment, sends it, and 
confirms that the acknowledgement has been received. The first general knows 
this, so she sends an acknowledgement that the second general’s confirmation 
has been received, but must wait for that notice to be confirmed, and so on. Of 
course, in the real world, the generals can reach various levels of practical 
confidence,57 but they cannot reach absolute certainty. Thus, unless they want 
to rule out all possibility of a coordinated attack, they must take at least some 
risk that they might not attack together. 
In most business settings, identifying a point past which contracting 
parties will have sufficient confidence probably has little to do with identifying 
a particular “acceptance” or the offer that preceded it. The exception to this 
muddle is the classic case of contracts concluded at a distance with significant 
delays, usually through the mail—where the communication is punctuated and 
can, in its entirety, be reconstructed. The “mailbox rule,” or any number of 
similar plausible candidates for an alternate rule, serves a useful coordinating 
function in those environments. But those cases are of sharply diminished 
importance in the modern commercial world. As I discuss further in Part III 
infra, artificially constructing a single definite “acceptance” out of a verbal 
 
53. Adams v. Lindsell, (1818) 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B.). 
54. See E.A. Akkoyunlu et al., Some Constraints and Tradeoffs in the Design of Network 
Communications, in SOSP ’75, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ACM SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING 
SYSTEMS PRINCIPLES 67, 70 (J.C. Browne & Juan Rodriguez-Rosell eds., 1975) (“In an arbitrary 
distributed facility, it is impossible to provide complete status.”). 
55. See Jim Gray, Notes on Data Base Operating Systems, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER 
SCIENCE: OPERATING SYSTEMS 393, 465–66 (R. Bayer et al. eds., 1978). 
56. See id.; see also ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION 57 (Pascal Petit ed., 2001); Eric Pacuit & 
Rohit Parikh, Reasoning About Communication Graphs, in INTERACTIVE LOGIC 135, 148 (Johan van 
Benthem et al. eds., 2007). 
57. See generally Pacuit & Parikh, supra note 56. 
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conversation requires, at best, the construction of a useless fiction; at worst, it 
leads to problematic results. 
Similarly, parties don’t just engage each other informally, without 
knowledge of contract law; they also often talk in ways that misuse the 
terminology of contract law and probably cannot be formally mapped onto its 
substance. For example, in refinancing a mortgage recently, my lender wrote to 
me of its “counter offer letter, which you’ve already accepted.”58 It probably 
did this just because it wanted its file to match what we had already 
substantively agreed to elsewhere. As a related matter, it is also common to see 
agreements that describe themselves as occurring “in one or more counterparts, 
each of which are originals and all of which constitute a binding agreement.” 
Analyzing such documents from the perspective of the reductive offer-and-
acceptance model would serve no purpose. In these situations, as in the others I 
have discussed, analyzing whether at least one of the parties reasonably thinks 
there is a binding contract would better track the parties’ goals, as well as the 
moral and policy objectives that the law seeks to implement by legally 
enforcing the parties’ promises. 
B. Potentially Poor Results 
In addition to needlessly complicating contract formation, the offer-and-
acceptance doctrine also leads to potentially poor results as the paradigm is 
stretched. The concern is that applying the paradigm leads to decisions ill-
considered on substantive grounds. The offer-and-acceptance model threatens 
to do more harm than good if we use it to decide difficult cases.59 
An interesting test case involves definite and concurring offers that cross 
each other in the mail (or any similar mechanism for delayed communication). 
For example, suppose I write you (presumably after some preliminary 
discussions) an e-mail offering to sell you my car for $12,000 and you, at 
roughly the same time, write me an e-mail offering to buy it for the same price. 
We both then read the crossed e-mails. In such a case, there is no traditional 
sequence of “offer and acceptance”; the question is whether courts should 
enforce a contract between the parties. Though this case has very rarely been 
litigated,60 most commentators tend to assume that there should be no 
 
58. E-mail from Tami Rice, Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, to Shawn Bayern (Nov. 23, 2011) 
(on file with author). 
59. As an analogy, consider Stephen Sugarman’s similar type of arguments against the 
“assumption of risk” doctrine in tort law. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Assumption of Risk, 31 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 833, 835 (1997) (“My argument here is something of a mixed positive and normative one. On the 
one hand, I offer what I believe to be a parsimonious explanation for most of the existing cases, one 
that rejects ‘assumption of risk’ as both superfluous and unilluminating of the real reason for the result. 
On the other hand, by offering a better way of thinking about the cases, my analysis helps correct the 
mistakes that I believe some courts have made.”). 
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 cmt. d (1981) (“Cases have occurred in 
which identical offers have crossed in the mails. Such an event is unusual . . . .”). 
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enforceable contract—although they rarely justify that position on substantive 
grounds. The formal grounds are somewhat clear: in addition to potential 
problems with consideration (one offer is not given in exchange for another), 
there has been no classical sequence of offer followed by acceptance. As usual, 
this formal analysis has obscured the underlying substantive questions. 
It is worth a small detour to examine the origins of the classical, formal 
analysis of this question. That analysis is particularly thin in this area, both 
doctrinally and substantively; that is, there is almost no case law on the matter. 
The relevant case law that does exist is nonetheless commonly taken as 
authoritative even though little attempt has been made to justify the rule on 
social or business-related grounds. 
The doctrine that “cross-offers” are necessarily unenforceable dates to 
(and largely rests on) a single English case, Tinn v. Hoffman & Co.61 This case 
appears to have resolved the matter for England and the Commonwealth in 
dicta,62 and it is ordinarily the only doctrinal authority for the few American 
sources that consider the question.63 The only reason that the judges in Tinn 
seem to provide in holding that no contract is formed is that there is no clear 
way to construct “offer and acceptance” from identical offers that cross each 
other in the mail. If that indeed is what motivated their thinking (and little else 
is apparent), the case serves as an excellent example of the potential problems 
in applying the offer-and-acceptance doctrine mechanically. 
 
 The precise reason for the rarity is unclear. Perhaps substantially identical offers rarely cross each 
other in the first place, but such a phenomenon doesn’t seem obviously more obscure than similar 
problems that have arisen frequently (like revocations that cross acceptances in the mail). Charles 
Fried, one of the few American writers to address the problem squarely, calls it “largely theoretical” 
because parties facing the problem “would immediately pick up the telephone to straighten out the 
confusion.” CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 54 (1981). But Fried’s supposition seems 
unconvincing. On one hand, it would prove too much because it would apply to most other problems 
of transacting at a distance, some of which have persisted alongside telephones. On the other, it is not 
correct to assume that in all circumstances of crossed offers, parties necessarily think there is 
something to clarify. As a rough example, if I receive a message from an associate dean saying “I’m 
adjusting the fall schedule; would you mind moving your class to 3:00?” at roughly the same time as 
I’ve written an e-mail that reads “Actually, I’ve noticed a conflict; could you move my class to 3:00 
instead of 2:00?” then the dean would likely reasonably think she could simply adjust the schedule 
without further confirmation. To put it differently, I would probably be unreasonable to object later 
that the class was moved without any agreement to move it. Consider, also, the sorts of cases I discuss 
at infra text accompanying note 69. 
Moreover, even if Fried is correct as a matter of fact, his remark potentially puts the cart before 
the horse if the question is what the best rule of contract law would be: parties surely wouldn’t think 
they needed to follow up with one another if contract law made enforcement in such cases clear. Cf. 
infra note 70 and accompanying text. Even more fundamentally, even if Fried’s assumption about the 
parties is correct, it suggests a substantive rather than formal analysis of the case; I have no objection 
to courts’ refusing to enforce crossed offers if the parties do not expect them to do so. 
61. [1873] 29 L.T. 271 (Ex. Ch.). 
62. See MINDY CHEN-WISHART, CONTRACT LAW § 2.3.2, at 65 (4th ed. 2012) (citing Tinn but 
giving no new substantive justification). 
63. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.10, at 107 (4th ed. 2004). 
 86 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:67 
In Tinn, one judge in the majority wrote simply that “you cannot make [a 
contract] by cross offers, and say that the contract was made by one party 
accepting the offer which was made to him.”64 Judge Blackburn added, “I do 
not think exchanging offers would, upon principle, be at all the same thing” as 
an offer followed by an acceptance, but he never suggested what the 
“principle” was or whether it would be desirable on any substantive grounds.65 
His one attempt at a functional justification was to hint that it would cause 
“grave inconvenience” to change the rules despite observing just a few 
sentences earlier in his opinion: “There is, I believe, a total absence of authority 
on the point. I do not think, though I am not sure, that the question has ever 
been raised before.”66 
Notably, one judge in Tinn disagreed with the others. Judge Honyman 
wrote: 
I cannot see why the fact of the letters crossing each other should 
prevent their making a good contract. If I say I am willing to buy a 
man’s house on certain terms, and he at the same moment says that he 
is willing to sell it, and these two letters are posted so that they are 
irrevocable with respect to the writers, why should not that constitute a 
good contract?67 
The best way to answer the question raised in crossed-offer cases is 
simply, in my view, to apply the same general principle that I have already 
outlined: Does one of the parties reasonably think there is a contract, or do both 
of the parties subjectively think there is a contract? The Restatement Second is 
not far from this position, at least in its comments. In explaining why crossed 
offers should not form a contract, it claims that “the ordinary offer does not 
manifest assent to the formation of a contract in this way.” If the Restatement 
means by this that parties do not ordinarily intend to be bound if their offers 
cross, that is at least a potentially valuable (and perhaps decisive) substantive 
reason that courts should not determine that an enforceable contract results 
from crossed offers. 
To put it differently, the question should not be whether an acceptance 
followed an offer or whether an offer induced an acceptance. In order to 
achieve the substantive goals of contract law, the question of contract formation 
should simply be an interpretive one,68 grounded in the parties’ intent and 
expectations. 
 
64. Tinn, 29 L.T. at 278. (Brett, J.). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 279 (Blackburn, J.). 
67. Id. at 275 (Honyman, J.). 
68. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 cmt. d (“This is a matter of 
interpretation; theoretically, just as the offeror may assent in advance to an acceptance, so each of two 
offerors could assent in advance to a cross-offer.”). 
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Suppose two people agree simultaneously to a contract in person. They 
might do this with, for example, quickly exchanged words. In environments 
where it makes sense, like among contracting parties who know each other well 
or who share the norms of a quick and hectic marketplace or a professional 
auction, they might do it with mere glances or hand gestures. Particularly if 
they then simultaneously shake hands or perform some other joint act, there 
should be little doubt that the parties have formed an enforceable contract. In 
the general case, it is unclear why the substantively unimportant lack of literal 
simultaneity in the crossed-offer cases, where the parties use methods of 
delayed communication, ought to change that result. The lack of simultaneity 
does not inherently cause the parties to behave differently, or to have different 
expectations, from those in cases of in-person simultaneity. 
More directly, as a general matter, there are substantive advantages to 
accelerating the formation of contracts in ambiguous cases where it is 
nonetheless clear that the parties agree on relevant terms. Most importantly, if 
the parties agree or are likely to agree, accelerating formation generally 
promotes potentially beneficial reliance by one or both of the parties. For 
example, someone planning to sell a car can be more confident in taking steps 
to execute the sale, or a factory manufacturing an item can begin production 
earlier. A rule that makes enforcement clear in crossed-offer cases would also 
probably cut down on the costs of contracting for the parties; it would eliminate 
the need for the parties to follow up with further e-mails or more direct 
communication. Similarly, it could discourage the parties from continuing to 
bargain over terms when further bargaining would likely do nothing other than 
reallocate the existing contractual surplus (that is, the gains from the contract). 
Moreover, in at least some cases of crossed offers, there may be additional 
moral reasons for enforcement. If the offers are framed explicitly as conditional 
promises, it is probably wrongful for a party to insist that no contract is formed. 
Suppose parties exchange e-mails that say, “If you’re willing, I promise to enter 
the joint venture that we discussed.” Framed as a moral commitment, such 
communications probably carry moral obligations, and social morality is one 
significant pillar of contract law.69 
 
69. For a recent discussion of the interplay of morality and efficiency in contract law, see 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of Efficient Breach, and the 
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1012 (2005) (“[T]he efficiency of the 
contracting system rests on a tripod whose legs are legal remedies, reputational effects, and the 
internalization of social norms, in particular the moral norm of promise-keeping.”). 
Melvin Eisenberg has defined social morality as follows: 
By social morality, I mean moral standards that claim to be rooted in aspirations that apply 
to all members of the community and, on the basis of an appropriate methodology, can 
fairly be said to have substantial support in the community or can be derived from norms 
that have such support. In contrast, critical morality consists of moral standards whose truth 
does not depend on community beliefs and attitudes, except insofar as such beliefs and 
attitudes are relevant to the application of the moral standards. 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1645, 1651 n.5 (2003). 
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It is worth noting that my contention is not that all cross-offers should 
create enforceable contracts; the touchstone should simply be (as usual in 
modern contract law) the parties’ expectations, and divining such expectations 
is fundamentally an interpretive question not easily reduced to formulas. An 
interesting difficulty arises here, one that has been insufficiently explored in 
contract literature in general: What is to be done when suboptimal law has 
influenced parties’ expectations in a counterproductive way? That is, what if 
parties expect that cross-offers don’t form enforceable contracts merely 
because the doctrine (thin as it is) has suggested that they don’t? There is 
unlikely to be a comprehensive, general answer to that question; the best 
response will depend on the strength of the underlying expectations, the 
benefits to be gained by changing them, and the likelihood that the law could 
change people’s expectations in the first place.70 
The few commentators to suggest a less richly substantive or interpretive 
analysis of the problem rarely give reasons for such a view. As in Tinn, the 
typical reason is often purely formalistic. The Restatement Second suggests an 
analysis similar to mine, with perhaps a thumb on the scale, as an interpretive 
matter, against enforceability.71 Interestingly, the civil-law tradition appears to 
reach a similar result for similar reasons to those I have proposed; at least, a 
Louisiana court, applying civil law, has noted that cross-offers form a contract 
under the civil law “because (1) there is a concurrence of wills and (2) the law 
favors the formation of contracts.”72 Similarly, Arthur Corbin reached the right 
 
70. Mark Gergen has helpfully suggested in conversation that an additional reason not to 
enforce cross-offers is that they do not exhibit the sort of mutual understanding that contracts 
ordinarily exhibit, where each party knows that the other intended to form a contract. For example, 
Thomas Scanlon outlines a principle under which contracts should be enforced when, among other 
things, “A acts with the aim of providing . . . assurance, and has good reason to believe that he or she 
has done so,” “B knows that A has the beliefs and intentions just described,” “A intends for B to know 
this, and knows that B does know it,” and “B knows that A has this knowledge and intent.” Thomas 
M. Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199, 208 (1990). Cross-offers arguably 
lack this distinctive type of agreement. They may, however, still meet Scanlon’s principle, at least as 
much as ordinary cases concluded over delayed communication do, for in many such cases parties 
may not literally have simultaneous intentions. More importantly, even if cross-offers lack the sort of 
agreement that Scanlon describes, I am not confident that is a sufficient basis for refusing to enforce 
obligations that result from them. They may be exceptional sorts of obligations, and perhaps they do 
not deserve to be called contracts, but the classification of them for these purposes should not affect the 
functional discussion in the text. 
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 23 cmt. d. 
72. Spiers v. Seal, 426 So. 2d 631, 634 (La. Ct. App. 1982). Much European commentary 
appears consistent with this position. See Joseph M. Perillo, Book Review, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 144, 
149 (1968) (reviewing 1 & 2 FORMATION OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF 
LEGAL SYSTEMS (Rudolph B. Schlesinger ed., 1968)) (referring to “respectable arguments for 
[forming contracts based on crossed offers] among German, Swiss and Austrian writers”). As 
Professor Perillo nicely observes, “If the parties have manifested assent to the same terms and, at least, 
if this manifestation arises out of on-going negotiations, what need is there to impose the additional 
requirement that there be an offer and acceptance?” Id. Note that the continuation of ongoing 
negotiations that Professor Perillo mentions may be one feature of contracting context that a case-by-
case analysis would illuminate. 
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sort of substantive analysis by rejecting an overly formal dependence on the 
notion of an acceptance. “There is,” he wrote, “no inevitable necessity in our 
adoption of the machinery of offer and acceptance. The rules of contract, like 
all other rules of law, are based upon mere matters of policy, or belief as to 
policy.”73 
Charles Fried has defended the classical view of crossed offers on both 
formalistic and administrative grounds. He posits two letters sent on Monday 
that cross one another in the mail and arrive on Wednesday for both parties. 
Noting that “it seems most natural to me to say that there is no contract,”74 he 
concludes that “what was not an acceptance nor intended as one on Monday 
cannot turn into an acceptance on Wednesday.”75 So far, that is a purely formal 
conclusion, and it is hard to see why it should be persuasive. But Fried 
continues to suggest an essentially administrative problem with enforcement of 
contracts created by crossed offers: “Consider the inconveniences of a rule 
holding that a contract concluded on Wednesday. Neither A nor B knows that 
the other is in receipt of his letter, so the circumstances that would create the 
contract are not known to either party.”76 Fried later undercuts this argument, 
however, by admitting that the parties both “showed themselves willing to take 
the risk of being contractually bound without knowing it” merely by sending an 
offer that could have been accepted.77 Ultimately, he rests his position on an 
assertion of intuition, much like the most generous interpretation of Judge 
Blackburn in Tinn: finding an enforceable contract “would at least require the 
promulgation of a rule to that effect, for the result lacks the intuitive naturalness 
of the standard offer-and-acceptance case.”78 This argument from intuition, 
however, is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it amounts to little more 
than traditionalism in form—to a general assertion, ironically contrary to the 
tradition of the common law, that judges cannot or should not change the law. 
Second, it assumes that business parties are familiar with the details of the 
offer-and-acceptance paradigm; this is probably not true in general, and it is 
particularly doubtful when there is apparently little more than one case in favor 
of the proposition in all of Anglo-American contract law’s history—an English 
case dating to the late 1800s.79 
 
73. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations, 26 
YALE L.J. 169, 183 (1917); see also K. N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and 
Acceptance, I, 48 YALE L.J. 1 (1938); K. N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and 
Acceptance, II, 48 YALE L.J. 779 (1939). 
74. FRIED, supra note 60, at 53. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 54. 
78. Id.  
79. An old contract-law treatise, WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 151, 
at 224 (2d ed. 1920), cites what appears to be a second case on the matter, an obscure unpublished 
opinion from Kentucky that touches only briefly on the question without providing any substantive 
reasoning. Oddly, the treatise appears to cite the case incorrectly; the unpublished case can be found at 
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III. 
MOVING BEYOND OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE 
This Part makes two related arguments. The first is somewhat more 
radical than the discussion of Part II; it is that in focusing excessively on a 
moment of contract formation, the offer-and-acceptance doctrine wrongly 
suggests that we can determine whether contracts exist solely from a putative 
acceptance and information that precedes it. Instead, my argument is that 
information subsequent to classical acceptances can and should influence 
contract formation. Related, but much more radical, my second argument is that 
contract formation should simply not be seen as necessarily irreversible in most 
cases; instead, contract law should, for reasons of morality and efficiency, 
adopt a new theory more consciously tied to the purposes of expectation 
damages in the first place. On this view, it is not words or agreements that 
alone cause a contract to be formed. Rather, those words and those agreements 
interact with the parties’ ongoing circumstances, and the precise moment of 
appropriate contract formation may ultimately have nothing to do with the 
agreements the parties exchanged but rather with other circumstances that arise 
later in their dealings. Perhaps ironically, such a theory could also offer the 
parties better certainty as to the precise timing of contract formation than the 
current offer-and-acceptance model. 
A. Conversation Plus: Putting Dialogue in Its Place 
Historically, the doctrine of offer and acceptance led to odd and 
unjustifiable results when applied with the superficial analytical rigor of 
classical contract law. For example, under classical contract law, an offer of a 
unilateral contract (“I’ll pay you $100 if you paint my house”) could not be 
accepted by partial performance of the invited act (painting most of the house) 
even though the painter would clearly believe himself to have a right to be paid 
by the offeror.80 
That doctrinal error has been corrected,81 but a potentially significant 
remaining problem is that the offer-and-acceptance doctrine tries to maintain 
that communication leading up to a putative offer or acceptance is sufficient 
(coupled with the candidate offer or acceptance in question) to determine its 
legal status. Consider the following hypothetical dialogue between an artist at 
an art festival and a potential buyer: 
1. B: “I’d like to buy your painting for $500.” 
 
Ratterman v. Campbell, 26 Ky. L. Rptr. 173 (1904). For its part, the Page treatise states simply “cross-
offers do not constitute a contract” without attempting a justification. PAGE, supra, at 224. There is 
arguably contrary American authority as well. See, e.g., Morris Asinof & Sons, Inc. v. Freudenthal, 
186 N.Y.S. 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921) (referenced in Perillo, supra note 72). 
80. See Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, 
Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1992). 
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981).  
 2015] OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE IN MODERN CONTRACT LAW 91 
2. S: “Agreed.” 
3. B: “Do you take credit cards?” 
4. S: “No.” 
5. B: “Oh, sorry, then I have no way to pay.” 
A classical contract theorist—and, too often, those who write Contracts 
exams—may conclude that we can determine for certain at step 2 (or, perhaps 
more precisely, immediately upon the completion of step 2) in the dialogue that 
there is a contract. Maybe he or she would pick some other stage of the 
dialogue. Regardless of the particular step such a theorist would decide sets 
forever the parties’ legal obligations to each other, my concern is that the 
question is the wrong one to be asking. It is only after considering what is later 
said that we can know whether the parties intended after step 2 to be bound; it 
is simply not the case, I think, that we want only the communications and acts 
up to a certain time to matter in determining the presence of a contract at that 
time. 
Now, perhaps steps 3 through 5 matter only as interpretive clues; that is, 
perhaps they affect our determination about whether there is a contract after 
step 2 by giving a factfinder greater information about what statements 1 and 2 
meant at the time they were uttered. My contention is that the problem is 
deeper, however, and that what is said after step 2 can actually cause what 
would otherwise have been a contract to evaporate. It is not that a right or duty 
arose upon step 2 and was later removed because of some sort of excuse to 
performance (in this case, perhaps something like impracticability under the 
circumstances); it is that statement 2, no matter how unequivocal an acceptance 
in form, simply does not alone provide a mechanism for a contract to be 
formed. For example, statement 2 might read “You have a deal; I am very 
pleased to sell it to you at that price and will begin to pack up the painting 
immediately.” Nonetheless, it would not necessarily create a contract, even if 
statement 1’s status as a classical offer is similarly strengthened, perhaps along 
the lines of “I propose a contract for the sale of your painting and will purchase 
it for $500 if you agree.” 
My contention may amount to little more than a simple recognition that it 
is not an utterance like that in step 2, but rather that utterance combined with 
something more (even if just a subsequent period of silence) that serves as an 
acceptance. But that recognition alone suggests that an analysis of contract 
formation should focus more on a course of conduct as a whole rather than on a 
specific hypothetical moment of contract formation. 
Consider what has become the standard practice for online retail 
commerce: customers add items to a virtual “shopping cart” or “shopping 
basket” and then “check out,” supplying payment information.82 Even then, it’s 
unclear whether a sale has been completed; many organizations provide 
 
82. See generally ZHENG QIN, INTRODUCTION TO E-COMMERCE (2009). 
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opportunities to cancel (and have “terms” posted on the site that purport to 
provide such a cancellation as a matter of right to customers) after the final 
check-out. Many airlines, for example, provide the opportunity to cancel even 
“nonrefundable” tickets up to 24 hours after purchase; it is unclear whether 
most consumers know of this or not, but I suspect they don’t.83 Sometimes, 
buttons on a website are labeled “confirm” but do not themselves trigger what 
is legally an acceptance; that is, often even terminology that suggests finality 
does not in practice lead to finality. General expectations of customers seem to 
be something like the following: they continue interacting with a website until 
it gives a final confirmation, with indicia of confirmation that have become 
familiar (an order number, an e-mail confirmation). Even then, there may well 
be legitimate and appropriately enforceable expectations that one side, or both, 
can cancel the order upon subsequent contact in a reasonable amount of time 
(say, a few minutes, and in many situations perhaps longer). Perhaps in many 
cases consumers expect to be able to refuse to accept a shipment of goods from 
a website, and thus to avoid payment. 
Overall, there is a spectrum rather than a binary, on-off mechanism: at 
some point, the transaction runs its course, and both sides’ attention returns to 
other things. It is only at that point, often, that we can evaluate whether a 
contract has been made. That evaluation has little to do with one particular 
offer and one particular acceptance. 
B. Acceptance and Irreversibility: Tying Contract Formation to the Purposes  
of Contract Remedies 
The discussion so far points the way toward what may be a further-
reaching reconsideration of contract doctrine—specifically, a questioning of the 
assumption that contracts are generally irreversible and that expectation 
damages are fully available a moment after the formation of a contract. Other 
than tradition and administrative simplicity, it is unclear what justifies this 
rule—and even those two bases seem relatively weak here. The “tradition” is 
just a tradition among lawyers and has no necessary direct bearing on the way 
that contracting parties conduct themselves. Most contracting parties probably 
don’t rely on it, particularly (as we shall see shortly) in cases where so little 
time has passed since the putative formation of a contract that reliance is not 
even possible. The “administrative simplicity” is itself murky, for it leads 
courts to decide potentially unnecessary questions about the precise moment of 
contract formation. 
 
83. The Department of Transportation has relatively recently adopted regulations that require a 
24-hour refund period for ticket sales in many circumstances. See 14 C.F.R. § 259.5 (2011) (requiring 
that airlines publish a policy “allowing reservations to be held at the quoted fare without payment, or 
cancelled without penalty, for at least twenty-four hours after the reservation is made if the reservation 
is made one week or more prior to a flight’s departure”). 
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Consider a case where a contract is formed and shortly thereafter, without 
any reliance on either side, one of the parties decides the contract was a bad 
idea and wishes to cancel its formation. Prior commentary has recognized at 
least two ways of treating this scenario: (1) the typical rule of contract law, 
enforcing the contract with expectation damages;84 (2) a greater emphasis on 
reliance damages in contract law in general, and perhaps a limitation of 
contract enforcement to that level of damages in these cases (implying no 
damages here because there is no reliance).85 
There is an intermediate course, however. Expectation damages offer 
significant advantages in upholding morality and in encouraging efficient 
performance of, and reliance on, contracts.86 But as I will explain, the benefits 
of an expectation-damages regime are unclear where (1) no reliance has yet 
been possible, (2) no performance has yet been possible, and (3) no opportunity 
for speculation exists that would make rescission unfair. Accordingly, there 
seems to be little justification for offering expectation damages in cases where 
one party decides shortly after formation, based on an internal reevaluation, 
that the contract is a bad idea. Such a reevaluation would not normally provide 
the basis for any sort of excuse related to “mistake” or “unexpected 
circumstances”; my contention is that rescission should nonetheless be 
available. 
1. Insufficient Justifications for Enforcement: Immediate Irreversibility and the 
Functions of Contract Enforcement 
To see why this view of contract formation is both moral and efficient, it 
will be helpful to review the reasons for contract enforcement (through 
expectation damages) in general. As Melvin Eisenberg and I have previously 
explained,87 expectation damages broadly serve two instrumental goals: they 
encourage efficient rates of performance (along with precaution to prevent 
unintentional breach) by promisors, and they encourage efficient reliance by 
promisees. As an example of these two benefits, consider a contract for the 
manufacture of a custom-built piano for $8,500. Idealized expectation damages 
that incorporate the piano’s entire subjective value to the promisee (the buyer) 
are necessary for the promisor (the manufacturer) to incorporate into its own 
cost-benefit calculus the harm it would cause by failing to deliver the piano as 
 
84. This is, of course, the general doctrinal result. See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, 
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 540) (on file with 
author) (“The instant an offer is accepted, each party becomes liable for expectation damages if he fails 
to perform, even if he changes his mind only a nanosecond after the contract is formed.”). 
85. See L. L. Fuller & William R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 
46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (Ronald K.L. 
Collins ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
86. For a detailed exposition of this point, refuting many recent objections to the efficiency of 
expectation damages, see generally Bayern & Eisenberg, supra note 10. 
87. Id. at 2–8. 
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promised.88 In doing so, expectation damages encourage efficient performance. 
They also, in a closely related way, cause the promisor to take precaution 
against accidental breach—such as the piano falling apart a few days after it is 
delivered, which would amount to a breach of warranty. 
Expectation damages also encourage efficient reliance on the promisee’s 
end. Once the contract is made, the promisee can, for example, begin to take 
piano lessons knowing that they will pay off in the enjoyment of playing the 
purchased piano.89 
Finally, expectation damages uphold social morality; they comport with 
socially moral norms of promise-keeping, and they prevent one party from 
taking advantage of another: 
We cannot know whether A would have rendered . . . performance to B 
for any lesser price. Requiring A to accept any lesser price would 
therefore unfairly convert A from a voluntary to an involuntary actor, 
because if A had known in advance that the contract price was not 
enforceable in full, he might not have agreed and performed.90 
Expectation damages essentially bolster a bet that the parties have made, and it 
would be unfair to let one of them undo that bet subsequently: “[I]n most cases 
allowing a promisor to measure damages by anything less than the contract 
price would have the same unfair quality as allowing a person who has lost a 
fair bet to renege.”91 Of course, this analysis is not meant to suggest that it is 
morally necessary to enforce promises even when unconscionable, or even 
when excused by impossibility or some other factor. The point is just that in the 
general case, it is unfair to let a party make a contract and then break it with 
impunity without any supervening moral or instrumental justification. 
Perhaps surprisingly, these generally accepted reasons in favor of 
expectation damages very poorly justify the notion that a contract must be 
irreversible immediately after acceptance. Recall that expectation damages 
(1) promote efficiency by encouraging efficient performance (and precaution 
against unintentional nonperformance), (2) also promote efficiency by enabling 
efficient reliance, and (3) are ordinarily consistent with social morality because 
they prevent parties from (a) converting others from voluntary into involuntary 
actors and (b) reneging on fair bets. None of these reasons supports immediate 
irreversibility of contracts. 
 
88. Though the measurement of damages is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth pointing 
out that expectation damages might not, in the real world, achieve this idealized objective; indeed, 
depending on how customized the order in the example is, specific performance rather than 
expectation damages may be a more suitable remedy. See Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific 
Performance, supra note 69, at 999–1003. 
89. Cf. Bayern & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 6–8 (discussing beneficial reliance on 
contracts). 
90. Id. at 5. 
91. EISENBERG, supra note 84 (manuscript at 980). 
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To remain with the example of a custom-ordered piano, suppose the 
customer commits to a sale (by signing a document or whatever else is required 
under the Statute of Frauds92 and all other doctrinal requirements). Suppose 
immediately afterwards, he changes his mind—or he receives a call from his 
partner, who remarks how bad an idea it would be to buy a custom-ordered 
piano for $8,500. A failure to enforce the “contract” that current doctrine 
assumes has been made would not undermine any of the goals of expectation 
damages: the manufacturer has not had a chance to perform or to take 
precautions against unintentional breach, the buyer has not had a chance to rely, 
and probably no fair bet has been broken. 
The first two of these observations (the instrumental ones) should be 
obvious because they are almost matters of definition in the example. The 
third—concerning whether a fair bet has been broken—requires more 
discussion. Perhaps on some level the buyer has broken a bet he’s made with 
the seller—specifically, a bet that he wouldn’t change his mind after agreeing 
to the purchase. The seller could, at least theoretically, have offered a price of 
$8,500 (rather than some higher price) to cause the buyer to make an impulsive 
purchase; the seller thus perhaps risked some lost component of the contractual 
surplus in exchange for a more likely inducement to an additional marginal 
sale. 
This possibility suggests an appropriate fact dependence in determining 
whether a purported contract should be treated as irreversible immediately after 
it is classically “formed.” On one side of the spectrum, parties may make a 
specific financial or psychological bet concerning the certainty of the 
transaction. To put it differently, they may specifically intend to allocate the 
risk of reversibility to one of the parties. In the real world, pure financial 
instruments—futures and options contracts, for example—often carry this 
explicit assignment of risk. Note that an attempt to repudiate a futures contract 
an instant after it is formed does not necessarily or directly cause a social 
deadweight loss, frustrate reliance, or inhibit effective planning. Its primary 
problem is that it is unfair given the assignment of risks to which the parties 
have agreed. That is, it would allow one party to speculate at the expense of the 
other in ways that the parties almost certainly intended (or would have 
intended) to prohibit. 
Perhaps surprisingly, then, the reason a financial transaction like a stock 
sale should be irreversible appears, in the first instance, to be moral. Any 
negative instrumental effects proceed, as they often do in contract law,93 from 
this transactional unfairness in a secondary way: if traders cannot expect stock 
 
92. For example Uniform Commercial Code would ordinarily require that a contract to 
purchase an $8,500 piano be memorialized in writing. U.C.C. § 2-201 (2012). 
93. Cf. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, supra note 69, at 1012 (explaining 
how the theory of efficient breach generates inefficiency by undermining the contracting system and 
the moral bases on which it partially depends). 
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sales or futures contracts to be reliable, they will be less inclined to enter into 
them, and as a result a market that is at least provisionally valuable weakens. 
On the other side of the spectrum, an ordinary sale of goods in a store 
likely does not carry, or need to carry, such a definite assignment of risk—
which is presumably why it is normal for consumers to expect they can return 
an unopened, unused good unless told explicitly that “all sales are final.”94 It is 
possible that in the case of a custom-negotiated sale, the seller indeed has asked 
the buyer to accept a risk that the buyer might change his mind (and the buyer 
has accepted that risk), but it would be groundless to assume, without more, 
that that is the ordinary case. 
Accordingly, to be precise, my argument is not that all contracts must be 
conditionally reversible; it is that contracts should be provisionally reversible 
unless the parties have explicitly or tacitly agreed otherwise. 
Putting aside direct, intended shifts of risk, the functional reasons for 
expectation damages directly suggest the conditions that should make contracts 
irreversible (and the timing of such irreversibility). Once the parties can make 
decisions that influence the likelihood of performance, the threat of 
enforcement is necessary, and that alone is probably sufficient for contracts to 
be treated as irreversible. The same is true of the possibility of decisions made 
in reliance on the contract. Once they materialize, the possibilities of 
performance and reliance provide sufficient instrumental reasons for treating 
contracts as irreversible. To put it differently, the instrumental reasons are 
probably sufficient once they arise, particularly because it is not unfair, after 
all, to ask parties to do what they promised to do. 
There is an additional moral boundary condition, separate from the 
instrumental concerns, that ought to trigger irreversible contract formation. 
Parties should not be permitted to rescind a contract if it would give them an 
opportunity to speculate at the other party’s expense. This opportunity for 
speculation ordinarily arises in two ways. First, there is a rapidly changing 
market, such as the public stock markets. In such cases, sales ought to be final; 
the opportunity to speculate based on small price differences should be 
presumed. Second, a party might learn new material information (ordinarily 
from some source external to the contracting parties themselves) that would 
affect the value of the contract. For example, in the case of the sale of a 
custom-made piano, suppose the promisee learns shortly after the sale (but 
before reliance or performance are meaningfully possible) that the price of 
some component necessary to the manufacture has skyrocketed as the result of 
a shortage. Given the normal terms on which people negotiate, it is unfair to 
shift that risk after concluding the negotiation. Once the new information is 
 
94. Indeed, it seems likely that given prevailing retail policies at outlets like Target, many 
customers expect they can even return undamaged goods once opened, even after a relatively long 
interval (like ninety days). See Return Policy, TARGET, http://help.target.com/help/subcategoryarticle 
?childcat=Return+policy (last visited Oct. 20, 2014). 
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learned, it becomes morally problematic to let a party reverse the contract 
merely because it is no longer desirable to that party. And though expectation 
damages would not serve their ordinary instrumental functions of directly 
promoting efficient reliance or performance in such cases, enforcement is not 
instrumentally problematic. It does not cause a social loss; it simply allocates a 
different amount of the contractual surplus to the buyer (or the seller) than he or 
she might have hoped. 
Accordingly, contracts should be treated as finally formed either when 
(1) the instrumental concerns discussed above (the materialization of a 
performance or reliance possibility) trigger, or (2) rescission would permit one 
party to obtain an advantage through speculation. 
Speculation, for these purposes, should be interpreted relatively narrowly. 
Merely changing one’s mind does not, on its own, permit non-negotiated 
speculation. Relatedly, as I mentioned above, the acquisition of new 
information that affects the value of the contract should ordinarily matter only 
when it comes from the external world, not the parties themselves. If a party 
“learns” new information through introspection and desires to change her mind 
accordingly, it is hard to say that permitting her to change her mind is unfair 
unless, as I have already discussed, (1) the parties have explicitly assigned the 
risk of that “evaluative” mistake to one of the parties;95 or (2) there is some 
instrumental reason to do so, such as the reasons behind promoting efficient 
performance and reliance. Likewise, if a party learns new information after 
classical contract formation from the other party, that reflects merely a 
manipulative failure by the other party to disclose relevant information. For 
example, it is difficult on moral grounds alone for a car dealer to insist on the 
performance of an agreement to purchase a new car if, right after the purchase, 
he says to the buyer, “Ha! I’m glad you’ve made this purchase. I didn’t think 
you would, because the car is a real clunker, and it’s been through three floods 
and a bedbug infestation. I’m surprised you didn’t ask about those things. Too 
late now.” 
In other words, though it is always possible for parties to choose to assign 
special risks in a contract, if the parties have not done so and no other 
instrumental reason has yet arisen to support contractual obligations, it is 
difficult to see why it is a plausible moral argument that what amounts to moral 
fraud should be permitted merely because a victim has already provisionally 
fallen for it. Even in cases where parties are permitted to deal sharply with one 
 
95. For more on “evaluative” versus other sorts of mistakes, see generally Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2003) (describing “evaluative 
mistakes” as arising “when an actor who was capable and well-informed at the time he made a contract 
comes to believe that his choice to make the contract was mistaken due to a change in either his 
preferences, his subjective valuation of the performances due under the contract, or the objective or 
market value of those performances”). 
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another for instrumental reasons,96 it is hard to see why those instrumental 
reasons would independently suffice to require enforcement of a contract 
immediately after classical contract formation if they don’t require such 
enforcement immediately before contract formation. For example, rules 
allowing nondisclosure of material information in contract law are usually 
defended in economic terms by those who suggest some type of productive 
incentive for discovering new information about the world.97 But such 
instrumental concerns are not sufficient to lead to obligations without ordinary 
contract formation; it is difficult to see why they should do so if the other 
instrumental and moral reasons in favor of contract formation do not support 
enforcement in a given instance. 
A final reason that might be seen to support the classical notion of 
irreversible contract formation upon acceptance is that parties supposedly have 
a moral duty to keep their promises immediately once they are made. This 
proposition, however, seems questionable to me. My own moral intuition is that 
someone who says, “I promise to take you out to dinner tomorrow. Oh, wait; 
sorry. I can’t,” has not actually made a moral commitment. This example 
suggests that the moral obligations associated with promises, like the legal 
obligations associated with contracts, don’t really start upon an utterance, but 
upon an utterance plus something more (silence, course of conduct, and so 
on).98 Indeed, often the possibility of performance-related preparations, of 
reliance, or of new material knowledge—that is, the same factors that ought to 
matter for contract law—seem necessary to trigger the moral commitment 
associated with a promise in the first place. A reversal of a promise before such 
possibilities materialize may seem fickle, but it is not obviously immoral in all 
or even most cases. 
2. Affirmative Arguments for Reversibility 
So far, my argument has been largely negative: there is no reason, given 
the usual goals of contract enforcement through expectation damages or similar 
mechanisms, that contracts should necessarily be seen as irreversible. This is 
enough at least to lead us to seriously question an otherwise largely 
unquestioned feature of classical contract law. But there are also specific, 
affirmative reasons to move away from the classical rule. In particular, there 
are several reasons to believe a more flexible set of rules concerning formation 
would promote greater efficiency than a more temporally static view. 
 
96. See Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, supra note 69, at 1647 (“[S]ocial morality 
indicates that when one party knows a material fact that is relevant to a proposed contractual 
transaction, and knows that the other party does not know the fact, nondisclosure normally is sharp 
dealing, or a kind of moral fraud. But against all this, in some classes of cases a requirement of 
disclosure can lead to inefficiency by decreasing the incentive to invest in the discovery of productive 
information.”) 
97. See id. at 1664–75. 
98. Cf. infra Part III.A (discussing the role of temporal context in dialogue). 
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Most fundamentally, the economic gains of contract law arise ultimately 
from enforcing the parties’ real agreement.99 To hold someone to enforceable 
obligations immediately upon saying “I accept” would likely be to get the 
parties’ intentions wrong, at least in many cases. Specifically, it likely runs 
against the grain of commonly accepted prospect theory in behavioral 
economics—the familiar notion that losses are psychologically weightier than 
gains.100 Though the psychological findings of prospect theory are often 
misunderstood by legal economists and depend on the framing of 
transactions101 (and thus would require greater empirical support for us to draw 
specific conclusions from them), it is plausible that when parties wish to 
reverse a contract a few minutes after forming it, they will perceive their 
inability to do so as a loss, whereas the other party will perceive her lost 
expectations merely as a forgone gain. 
In any case, the more general point is that where commercial norms may 
permit some fluidity, it is counterproductive to insist on a lack of fluidity in 
setting the moment of contract formation. 
The danger of that lack of fluidity, if parties become aware of it, leads to a 
secondary instrumental problem, which is that it will tend to discourage 
contracting and to increase the costs of contract negotiation and drafting. 
Parties will be more hesitant to enter agreements if they perceive the 
agreements as creating duties sharper than those they expected. They might 
insist on explicit disclaimers, spend more time reading refund policies 
carefully, and so forth. All that is a definite loss; it applies even to cases where 
no disagreement ends up arising. 
Moreover, the administrative benefits of a regime of irreversible contract 
formation are illusory. As is quite common in legal rhetoric,102 “certainty” is 
often an argumentative placeholder without substance. A rule that parties can 
opt out of contracts a few minutes after formation in the absence of 
performance, reliance, or speculation would not be especially difficult for 
courts to administer. In the case of written contracts, for example, it would be 
easy to produce a written request for rescission made a few minutes after 
classical formation, or to physically strike a signature from the original 
document. Indeed, in view of the discussion of Part II, the classical doctrine of 
offer and acceptance seems to create needless administrative headaches, and 
 
 99. See Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern 
Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 960 n.53 (2009). 
100. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
101. Cf. Shawn J. Bayern, Comment, Explaining the American Norm Against Litigation, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 1697, 1711 (2005) (“In general, loss aversion reflects the way in which a party 
‘frames’ a change in utility, so . . . alternative explanations . . . may be plausible on a theoretical level; 
empirical testing would be required to decide which account more accurately describes potential 
plaintiffs.”). 
102. See generally Bayern, Against Certainty, supra note 50. 
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this is not surprising; it requires the determination of a moment of contract 
formation when the moment is otherwise ordinarily irrelevant on substantive 
grounds.103 
Though the view of acceptance as final is rarely questioned, there is one 
area where contract law has adopted a set of rules at least loosely consistent 
with what I am proposing. These rules turn out not to be substantively 
important in many cases any longer, but their existence suggests that the 
fluidity and substantive responsiveness that I am proposing are not 
categorically unworkable. In particular, in contracts concluded at a distance 
(such as through the mail), a problem sometimes arises when an acceptance by 
action is invited and performed but never communicated to the offeror. So, for 
example, an offer letter might say “If you loan my brother money, I guarantee 
that I’ll pay you back if he doesn’t.”104 There is a tension in contract law here: 
if the recipient of that letter makes a loan, that itself amounts to acceptance, and 
a contract is concluded.105 However, it is unreasonable to expect the offeror to 
assume the offer has been accepted if she is not notified of acceptance. The 
Restatement Second addressed this problem by treating the offeror’s duty as 
“discharged” unless the promisee “exercises reasonable diligence to notify the 
offeror of acceptance,” the offeror in fact learns of acceptance through some 
other means, or the offer originally indicated that no acceptance would be 
required.106 
The Restatement Second’s approach seems broadly reasonable, but note 
that it permits a contract to be accepted but then for its duties to evaporate 
when there is no reasonable notice of the acceptance. That result ought to be no 
less strange to a contract formalist than what I have proposed, which is that a 
classically “formed” contract might nonetheless be “unformed” in situations 
where a party harmlessly changes her mind. 
CONCLUSION 
Most of the formalism of classical contract law has thankfully eroded in 
favor of a modern contract law responsive to concerns of morality and 
policy.107 One feature of classical law that hasn’t eroded, perhaps because it 
seems even more intuitive than the other axioms that were once accepted by 
formalist contract-law theorists, is an assumption that contracts require an offer 
and an acceptance. 
 
103. The relatively functional, anti-formalist Uniform Commercial Code recognizes as much 
when it specifies that “[a]n agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be found even 
though the moment of its making is undetermined.” U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (2002). 
104. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 54 cmt. d, illus. 5–6 (1981). 
105. Id. § 54(1). 
106. Id. § 54(2). 
107. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1743 (2000) (describing the replacement of static, formal rules with dynamic, 
substantive rules in contract law over the twentieth century). 
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That assumption is factually untrue, and the rules that rest on it are 
doctrinally confusing and normatively undesirable. Like most of classical 
contract law, and like analogously poor doctrines in tort such as “assumption of 
risk,”108 the classical rule covering offer and acceptance should be swept away 
in favor of substantive, social concerns. 
Most of the changes I have proposed are not radical. For example, there 
would be few reverberations throughout contract law from eliminating the 
stylized notion of acceptance that appears in the International Filter case and 
moving instead toward a more direct substantive inquiry concerning the parties’ 
expectations.109 Nor would it shake contract law’s foundations to admit that 
some “cross-offers” should form enforceable contracts. Even more broadly, it is 
simple prudence—simple application of morality and policy—to recognize that 
taking the offer-and-acceptance paradigm too seriously threatens at best 
needless work and at worst undesirable results. Contracts arise in a variety of 
ways, and it should be no surprise that the modes of formation adopted by the 
relatively small community that classical contract theorists envisioned are not 
the exclusive modes through which business and other affairs proceed. Courts 
should simply ask what parties reasonably think their obligations are, rather 
than forcing their interactions into what may not be a natural formality.110 
My further-reaching proposals—that proper contract-formation rules 
require greater sensitivity to acts subsequent to acceptance, and that 
enforceability should not depend on “formation” alone but on the possibilities 
of (1) decisions that affect performance, (2) decisions that affect reliance, and 
(3) speculation—are admittedly more radical. Still, as I have explained, they 
cannot by definition frustrate reliance, and they would likely not upset 
expectations either. Indeed, they would probably track most parties’ 
expectations better than the existing offer-and-acceptance paradigm. Courts 
could manage these changes incrementally if needed, permitting at first 
relatively narrow exceptions to classical formation doctrine and eroding the 
classical notion that legal rights and duties are altered forever “only a 
nanosecond after the contract is formed.”111 
  
 
108. Cf. Sugarman, supra note 59. 
109. See supra Section II.A.1. 
110. For discussion of the notion of “natural formalities,” see Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and 
Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
111. EISENBERG, supra note 84 (manuscript at 540).  
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